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CHAPTER 12
THE POLITICS OF THE
TRANSFORMATION OF POLICING
John Doyle
INTRODUCTIONThe issue of policing in Northern Ireland was both highly con-tested and of the foremost political salience for all the
political parties involved in the peace process, and also for their com-
munities. The contributions in the first two sections of this book
demonstrate not only the centrality of this issue for all the actors in-
volved but also the enormous difficulties that had to be overcome,
both to find and then to implement a workable agreement. Prior to
the peace process, on no other matter was there such a complete and
apparently unbridgeable divide between the two communities as there
was on policing. Based on this reality and the subsequent proposals to
‘remake’ policing in Northern Ireland, commentators from across the
political spectrum have portrayed the peace process as being built
upon the basic premise that nationalists agreed to local power-sharing
in the context of a constitutionally reformed UK, while in return they
were given reforms in the areas of civil and human rights, including
policing.1 This perspective has the effect of reducing the transforma-
tion of policing in Northern Ireland to the status of a concession to
nationalists; it was forcefully resisted by unionists, but finally agreed
once all sides believed that they had secured their constitutional pref-
erences. Contrary to the view of policing as a lower-order concession,
this chapter argues that the negotiations on policing were not at one
step removed from the core disputes on sovereignty and state power;
rather, the transformation of policing, as much as the new institutions
of government, reflected the consociational character of the 1998
Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and its institutionalised linkages
between Northern Ireland and Ireland.2
The attitudes of both communities to policing during the years of
conflict in Northern Ireland demonstrate that this issue was insepa-
rable from the wider constitutional question and from conflicting
definitions of citizenship. Initially, in the late 1960s, the demands of
the civil-rights movement focused on voting rights, equality of access
to employment, housing and policing—specifically seeking the abo-
lition of the police reserve unit referred to as the ‘B-Specials’.3 For
unionists, on the other hand, the police, including the B-Specials,
were defenders of the state against what they saw as an attempt at
radical insurrection. The aggressive response of the police to the civil-
rights protests from autumn 1968 onwards, radicalised and
entrenched Irish nationalist hostility to the police and marked the be-
ginning of international concerns with the RUC’s human-rights
record. The initial shock at the high level of inter-communal violence
in Northern Ireland led to the deployment of British troops there in
1969. The escalating crisis saw the British government take full
control of security, including policing, in 1972, leading to ‘direct rule’
from London and the end of the devolved Unionist government and
parliament in Northern Ireland. Unionists opposed the loss of local
control over policing, but in all other respects continued to support
the RUC as ‘their’ police force. In this, as in other respects, the overall
political divisions between unionists and nationalists were reflected
in the debates on policing.
This chapter analyses the critiques of policing in Northern Ireland
made by nationalists during the conflict, as represented by Sinn Féin
and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), who between
them secure the votes of almost 100 per cent of the nationalist com-
munity.4 It frames their position under three headings: 
• counter-insurgency and the demand for politically impartial policing; 
• human rights issues; and
• the unrepresentative make-up of the RUC. 
The chapter then analyses the arguments made by unionists in
defence of the RUC—primarily examining the attitudes of the major
unionist political parties, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)5 and
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). This is done in some detail, as
while nationalist critiques have been well documented and follow a
familiar international pattern in divided societies experiencing con-
flict, less attention has been paid to the nuance of the nature of
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unionist defences of the RUC. Both of these diametrically opposed
sets of views, in their different ways, centre on the constitutional
issue and demonstrate how the divisions on policing are bound up
with divisions on the nature of the state in Northern Ireland and on
the meaning of citizenship. The chapter then deals with the public
debates on the Report of the Independent Commission on Policing
for Northern Ireland,6 the subsequent legislation and the agreements
which saw both nationalist parties endorse the new policing arrange-
ments. The nature of these public debates and Agreements
highlighted the extent to which the transformation of policing in
Northern Ireland is fully bound up with progress in the wider peace
process, and the arrangements on recruitment, control and oversight
of policing reflect the underlying principles of the 1998 Belfast/ Good
Friday Agreement.
NATIONALIST PERSPECTIVES ON POLICING 
DURING THE CONFLICT
Nationalist critiques of the RUC during the conflict in Northern
Ireland can be conceptualised into three key areas. First, the RUC
was seen as a counter-insurgency force, committed to upholding not
only the Union with Britain but the dominant position of unionists
in Northern Ireland society. This view was true for moderate nation-
alists as well as republicans, and in the case of moderate nationalists
— who strongly opposed the use of political violence—was based on
the perception that policing practice went beyond what was neces-
sary, or functional, for counter-insurgency and was designed to
uphold Unionist privilege. The second key area of criticism, stem-
ming from this, was of the RUC’s human-rights record, with
concerns centring on what were considered to be heavy handed and
indiscriminate counter-insurgency practices. Third, nationalists
opposed the RUC based on the unrepresentative nature of its mem-
bership, which during this period had less than 8% of officers from
a Catholic background, and even fewer from the nationalist commu-
nity in Northern Ireland.7 This inequality was seen to reinforce, and
reflect, the unionist ethos of the RUC and to contribute to making
the force inherently incapable of policing the nationalist community.
These criticisms are a consistent and key component of the public
positions of the two major nationalist political parties in Northern
Ireland—Sinn Féin and the SDLP.
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Counter-insurgency and the demand for politically 
impartial policing
Sinn Féin’s core perspective on policing during the conflict centred
on their opposition, and indeed condemnation, of the RUC as an in-
strument of repression and counter-insurgency, whose primary aim
was to uphold British sovereignty over Northern Ireland. For Sinn
Féin, this view of the RUC was reflected in its title, both the use of the
word ‘Royal’ linking it to the British Crown and the use of the geo-
graphical descriptor Ulster (favoured by unionists) rather than the
more neutral Northern Ireland. The terminology used in Sinn Féin
statements and publications in the 1970s and 1980s reflected this per-
ception of the force, with the police usually referred to as ‘Crown
Forces’.8 While this view of the RUC as a force with a counter-insur-
gency mission was logical and consistent from the perspective of Sinn
Féin—supporters of the insurgency—this form of critique of the
RUC was widespread in the nationalist community. Leading moderate
nationalists also frequently criticised the force for the political bias of
its operational decisions and the behaviour of individual officers on
the ground.9 Having no confidence in the willingness of either a
unionist or a British government to change the RUC’s approach to
policing, the SDLP, shortly after its foundation, highlighted the need
for fundamental police reform. Institutionalised input from the Irish
government was a key demand of nationalists, and they also pursued
this position at the inter-party and inter-governmental talks at
Sunningdale in 1973.10
The RUC was fundamentally criticised by moderate nationalists for
going beyond what was required for effective counter-insurgency and
upholding the constitutional order (which was its legal duty) by effec-
tively distorting its policing mission with an anti-nationalist bias. In a
1976 pamphlet, Fr Denis Faul, a leading critic of Sinn Féin, went so far
as to call the RUC ‘an anti-Catholic paramilitary force’.11 One of the
most frequently cited examples of biased practices was the very different
ways that public protests were policed in nationalist and unionist areas.
For example, during the Ulster Workers Council strike of 1974 organ-
ised by loyalist paramilitaries, which effectively led to the collapse of
the then power-sharing government, the security forces made no cred-
ible attempts to remove road blocks or to arrest hooded paramilitaries
on ‘picket lines’, who were clearly seeking to intimidate those who sup-
ported power-sharing into not going to work.12 In contrast, the
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wide-scale protests and rioting in nationalist areas during the IRA
hunger-strike of 1981 saw 29,657 plastic bullets being fired by police—
leading to 7 deaths.13 Protests, riots and road blockages organised by
unionists opposed to the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement and against the
re-routing of Orange Order marches saw a much more measured re-
sponse. Even when major public institutions such as the port of Larne
were closed by protests, the police did not attempt to move the protest-
ers.14 Similar protests around Orange Order parades in 1995 and 1996
were again policed very differently in the two communities.15
Repeated examples of this type of differentiated policing of na-
tionalist and unionist public protest reinforced nationalist opinion
that the RUC was not simply keeping the law, but was upholding in
a partial manner unionists’ relative power over nationalists. John
Hume, when challenged at the time of the ceasefire as to whether the
SDLP attitude to the RUC over the years of conflict had been a
mistake, countered:
The basis of order in any society is agreement on how
you govern. When that is absent…the police are going
to be seen as being on one side or the other—which is
what happens in Northern Ireland…Until such time as
the political problem was resolved our position was that
we fully and unequivocally supported the police in up-
holding the rule of law. Our only qualification was that
they should do so impartially.16
The crucial point for Hume is that the RUC did not police impar-
tially and therefore did not meet the basic criteria for SDLP endorsement. 
For nationalists, the dominance of the counter-insurgency imper-
ative within the RUC meant that all other forms of policing were
subordinated to this primary aim. This was especially true of the
Special Branch—described as a ‘force within a force’ in the Policing
Commission’s report17—however, it impacted on all aspects of polic-
ing. For example, petty criminals and youths involved in anti-social
behaviour were frequently recruited to provide low-level intelligence
in nationalist areas.18 Their criminal activities were not interrupted
provided they could fulfil this intelligence-gathering function. More
generally, the gulf between the nationalist communities and the RUC
was so wide that the RUC had little capacity to engage in low-level
policing in nationalist areas, and the communities in those areas had
little reason to see the RUC as a force capable of playing this role.
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The SDLP repeatedly argued that the RUC’s heavy handed
counter-insurgency approach was counter-productive as well as inde-
fensible and that it was the primary reason for the party’s refusal to
endorse the force. In the aftermath of the shoot-to-kill controversies in
the 1980s, SDLP Deputy Leader Seamus Mallon asked 
can the Irish Government assume maximum trust when
dealing with the chief constable, a deputy chief consta-
ble and an assistant chief constable all of whom a senior
police officer…felt obliged to interview under criminal
caution.19
He answered his own question with a ‘resounding’ no and called
for an end to co-operation between the Garda Síochána20 and the
RUC until there were significant changes at RUC senior management
level. He went on to say that progress on policing could be measured
only by whether the RUC could gain sufficient confidence in main-
stream nationalist communities to allow people to join and live as
integrated members of the community with the community’s support,
and that this was a long way from being achieved 
The hostile attitude of the broad nationalist community was 
highlighted by Seamus Mallon shortly after the ceasefires when he 
referred to
the inability—the refusal, as it were, of a broad nation-
alist community in the north of Ireland to give its
support and allegiance to a system of policing in
Northern Ireland.21
His analysis cut to the heart of the problem when he argued that
Such an inability or refusal has existed since the very
foundation of the state. It cannot be solved by simplify-
ing the issue, by getting Catholics into the police service.
It is much broader, deeper and more fundamental than
that. It is about nationalist identification with the
process of policing and allegiance, not just to the police
as one part of the instrument of administration but to
the administration that is partly responsible for admin-
istering policing.22
Here, Mallon was encapsulating the nationalist critique of policing
as bound up by the contested nature of the state in Northern Ireland,
and nationalists’ refusal to give their support to the political and con-
stitutional status quo. As long as nationalists were excluded from the
effective governance of Northern Ireland, and as long as British policy
refused to acknowledge the contested nature of the state and relied
on a security-led approach to trying to manage the conflict, then no
broad nationalist support for policing was possible.
Human rights issues
Throughout the conflict both the SDLP and Sinn Féin made repeated
and vocal criticisms of the RUC’s human-rights record. The issues
consistently raised by nationalists over the years were allegations of ill
treatment and even torture during interrogation, summary executions,
the reckless use of plastic bullets and police collusion with illegal loy-
alist paramilitary groups. The position the nationalist parties took was
reinforced by the actions of external actors; for example, in the early
1970s the Irish state brought the UK to the European Court of
Human Rights over the treatment of people in police custody, while
the Carter administration in the USA banned the sale of firearms to
the RUC, citing human-rights concerns.23
Local critiques of the RUC often drew on material from interna-
tional human-rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch. These reports assisted the nationalist commu-
nity in effectively calling for inquiries into human-rights abuses, which
the British government found more difficult to ignore than purely
local protests.24 For example, in the early 1980s when the RUC was
accused of a targeted assassination policy, which resulted in the deaths
of six people including one civilian, international pressure led the
British government to set up an investigation under John Stalker
(deputy chief constable of the Greater Manchester Police in
England).25 Nationalists had sought an international investigation as
they did not trust any senior British police officer to act independently;
however, it is widely agreed that John Stalker attempted a rigorous
inquiry, only to have his actions blocked by senior RUC management
and officers. He was removed from the enquiry by the British govern-
ment shortly after submitting his interim report, and after allegations
of corruption were made against him (these were later proved to be
groundless). The investigation was taken over by another senior British
police officer (Colin Sampson, chief constable of the West Yorkshire
Police), who ultimately reported on the matter in 1987. 
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Following the inquiry, the report of which was never made public,
Attorney General Patrick Mayhew stated in 1988 that there would be
no further prosecutions of any police or MI5 officers as a result of this
inquiry, as to prosecute would not be in the interests of ‘national secu-
rity’.26 Consequently, only relatively junior officers were reprimanded
for issues related to obstructing the original Stalker enquiry. For nation-
alists the inadequacy of this response27 was reinforced by new
allegations of collusion between the RUC and illegal loyalist paramil-
itary groups that surfaced shortly after the Sampson report was
completed, forcing the British government to bring in a third senior
police officer (John Stevens, the deputy chief constable of
Cambridgeshire Police ) for yet another external investigation.
Nationalist dissatisfaction with this third investigation, which had in-
cluded an investigation into the killing of leading nationalist civil-rights
lawyer Patrick Finucane, led to a lengthy and ultimately unsuccessful
campaign for an international public inquiry into his death.28
Human-rights abuses were extensively documented and analysed,29
and local protests by nationalists received strong international endorse-
ment, all of which in turn impacted on nationalist critiques of the
RUC and reaffirmed their belief that the RUC could not merely be
reformed but had to be reconstituted. While nationalist campaigns on
human-rights issues, bolstered by international pressure, resulted in
investigations into these issues and in some minimal reforms, none of
these measures were successful in persuading members of the wider
nationalist community that the RUC was a legitimate police service
deserving of their support. Indeed, the conduct of these investigations
into human-rights abuses, and the limited and partial response to their
findings, tended to re-inforce nationalist alienation from the police
rather than mitigate it—the events around the ‘Stalker Enquiry’ being
an example of the pattern of interaction between the pressure for action
on human-rights abuse and the desire on the part of the British state
(and the unionist community) to defend its counter-insurgency policy.
An unrepresentative force
The small proportion of nationalists from Northern Ireland who were
members of the RUC was also a target of criticism from the SDLP and
Sinn Féin. They regarded the under-representation of nationalists
both as a result of what they saw as the anti-nationalist ethos of the
RUC, and also as a way in which that ethos was maintained. In 1998,
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when the Good Friday Agreement was signed, nationalists made up
between 44% and 48% of the working-age population in Northern
Ireland, but only 7.5% of RUC officers were ‘Catholic’, and as noted
above, fewer still were likely to be Irish nationalists.30 Nationalists
argued that a police service that so under-represented its community
could, by its very nature, never deliver policing in a manner acceptable
to that community; although as Mallon argued, above, the issue was
not one of numbers per se, but rather that nationalists’ refusal to join
or support the police was a clear indication of the need for change.
Nationalist critiques also linked the make-up of the RUC to what
they regarded as its ‘unionist’ ethos. The RUC reflected a unionist
culture and identity; police stations displayed photographs of the
British monarch and flew the Union Jack, and police officers were
embedded in and had strong links with unionist communities.
Nationalist communities were politically, culturally and geographically
perceived as the ‘other’, re-enforcing the gulf between the police and
the nationalist community.
Community distrust, the repeated release of credible reports of
human-rights abuses related to the counter-insurgency imperative
and the low representation of their community within the RUC
ensured that nationalist rejection of it as a legitimate police organ-
isation was strong throughout the period of the conflict in Northern
Ireland, and this remained the position of both major nationalist
parties in the aftermath of the ceasefires.31 Nationalists therefore
entered the period of the peace process with a strong sense that
policing was a key issue of concern in post-ceasefire negotiations.
Ulster unionists however, drew on a very different narrative of
support for the RUC and a rejection of nationalist critiques. An un-
derstanding of this alternative discourse on policing is crucial to
recognising why the issue was so difficult to negotiate following the
publication of the Patten Commission’s Report.
UNIONIST PERSPECTIVES: A CITIZEN’S DUTY TO SUPPORT
THE POLICING OF THE STATE
Unionists, like Irish nationalists, also saw issues of policing and security
as absolutely central to their political agenda. Unionist political parties
were, and are, unanimous in their broad support for the police and in
their rejection of nationalist critiques. A number of key themes are
common to unionist interventions on policing throughout the conflict
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and into the early period of the peace process. Unionist parties rejected
nationalist complaints about the pro-British ethos of the RUC. They
insisted, rather, that the ethos of the RUC should reflect British sov-
ereignty, and further argued that it was the duty of every citizen (and
every party) to support the RUC and to encourage people to join.
There was no acceptance of human rights critiques and unionists reg-
ularly called for more ‘hard line’ security tactics, such as capital
punishment, assassination of IRA members and internment without
trial. All of this took place in a context in which over 3,500 people lost
their lives in the conflict between 1969 and 1998, and the police and
British Army suffered considerable casualties: over 300 police officers
and over 700 British soldiers were killed.32 This inevitably heightened
tension and polarised political opinion. The low percentage of nation-
alist and Roman Catholic recruits to the RUC was dismissed as being
caused by the nationalist community’s support for terrorism or by IRA
intimidation. Finally, most unionists sought to restore control of the
police—which had been transferred to London in 1972—as they
feared that international pressure, or a desire by Britain to reach a po-
litical agreement with the Irish government, would shape RUC strategy
in a way that weakened its capacity, in their view, to defend the Union.
A duty of citizenship
Unionist politicians perceived Sinn Féin to be directly involved in an
armed insurgency, and so they had no expectation that Sinn Féin or
the party’s support base would back the RUC. Criticisms of nationalist
views on policing therefore focused on the more moderate SDLP,
which was the largest nationalist party until 2001. Criticism of the
SDLP for its failure to support the RUC unambiguously, or to en-
courage nationalist recruitment, spans the entire unionist political
spectrum and the entire time period of the conflict.
Unionist politicians repeatedly argued that they would not take
part in governmental power-sharing with the SDLP without the party’s
full support for the RUC. This was usually linked to an insistence that
supporting the police was a requirement of accepting British sover-
eignty over Northern Ireland. David Trimble,exemplifying this
insistence, said in 1976 that ‘no one has the right to be in a government
unless they can give full allegiance to the Province and publicly support
the security forces’.33 As the British and Irish governments sought to
open talks on the governance of Northern Ireland in the late 1980s, the
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then DUP Deputy Leader, Peter Robinson insisted that ‘any party
sharing responsibility for government should offer their full support to
the security forces in Northern Ireland and encourage followers to
support and even join them’.34 Even the most moderate ‘pro-Union’
party—the Alliance Party—ruled out power-sharing with the SDLP
unless it fully supported the RUC.35 The then party leader, John
Cushnahan, in a letter to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1987,
threatened to review Alliance support for the 1985 Anglo-Irish
Agreement unless the SDLP called on Catholics to join the RUC.36
In a conference speech later that year, Cushnahan ‘deplored’ the
SDLP refusal to ‘wholeheartedly support the police’ and said this was
a major block to political progress.37 Again, after the 1994 ceasefire,
leading UUP MP William Ross argued that unless the SDLP
members took their seats on the Police Authority and sought to per-
suade nationalists to support the RUC, it could not play a ‘responsible
part’ in Northern Ireland.38 The unanimity of unionist discourse on
this issue is striking. Nationalists were not being offered power-sharing
‘in return’ for supporting the police. Nationalists had, in unionist eyes,
an absolute duty to support the police. If nationalists refused to offer
that support then they had, in the unionists’ view, excluded themselves
from any right to hold public office. It is also an indication of the
scale of nationalist alienation from the RUC that the SDLP could not
endorse the service, despite the party’s strong desire to agree on power-
sharing with unionists.
The extent to which SDLP critiques of policing were seen as a
breach of the party’s duty of citizenship is further illustrated by the
degree to which unionists held SDLP members responsible for the
deaths of security force members—despite the party’s strong and con-
sistent opposition to the IRA campaign. John Carson (UUP) stated in
the House of Commons in 1976 that ‘political maggots, namely
Canavan, Mallon and Cooper are responsible for the deaths of UDR
men’.39 UUP leader Jim Molyneaux, said ‘vindictive accusations against
the security forces are treated as an incitement to murder Army, UDR
and RUC personnel…those who engage in such vile propaganda are
every bit as guilty as those who pull the trigger’.40 SDLP deputy leader
Seamus Mallon was attacked by the DUP’s Willie McCrea as 
the man who has contributed more to the murder of in-
nocent members of the security forces than practically
any other person in the SDLP community…by his
words [he] is stained with the blood of innocent people.41
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Indeed, responsibility for the murder of members of the security
forces was shared ‘equally by those who pulled the trigger and by those
politicians and church leaders who by their constant vilification have
endangered the lives of every member…’, according to Frank Millar.42
Unionists who directed such attacks at the SDLP were not simply
arguing that the party was morally responsible for RUC deaths; they
were insisting that it was the duty of all citizens to support the police.
This was the embodiment of Northern Ireland’s constitutional status
as part of the United Kingdom. In unionist eyes, if the SDLP rejected
this duty it was engaged in a constitutional insurgency against the
state and was therefore lending support to the IRA’s armed campaign.
Unionist perspectives on the role of the police in upholding the
political status quo extended to the operational level. UUP Deputy
Leader Harold McCusker, MP, in what represented a typical example
of this perspective, attacked the deployment of the RUC against
unionist protestors’ attempts to break through police lines where the
police had re-routed Orange Order marches away from nationalist
districts:
hundreds of policemen have been deployed, not against
republican thugs but against Protestant bands and their
supporters. How is that for getting your priorities
wrong?...The real choice confronting any police force
should be between the law abiding and the law breakers,
between those who uphold the constitution and those
who would subvert it, between the terrorists and their
agents and the rest of us.43
Unionists in the protests described by McCusker were clearly break-
ing the law by attacking police lines once the police had made a
decision on public order grounds to re-route the march. However, in
McCusker’s eyes the protestors were not ‘law breakers’—as they, unlike
nationalists, were ‘upholding the constitution’. Thus, in unionists’ per-
spectives, it was attitude to the constitutional status quo and not the
manner of protesting that divided ‘law breakers’ from the ‘law-abiding’.
‘Hard-line’ security rather than a human-rights focus
During the conflict, the widespread human rights-based criticisms of
the RUC from groups and individuals who were not supporters of an
Irish nationalist agenda did not open up any space within the major
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unionist parties for ‘non-political’ critiques of policing, based on legal
values or even arguments that such abuses strengthened the IRA. The
unionist parties attacked human rights groups as being engaged in a
campaign, deliberately or through naiveté, to undermine the state.
UUP leader James Molyneaux sharply criticised human-rights groups
‘who come to the rescue’ whenever the security forces would get the
upper hand on the IRA.44 The Catholic Bishops Commission for
Justice and Peace was called ‘the Irish Roman Catholic Commission
for Republican Victory in Northern Ireland’ by Unionist MP Jim
Kilfedder.45 Robert Bradford, a UUP MP, argued that whenever the
security forces came up with a strategy that was successful in ‘hinder-
ing the IRA…the opposition [of human rights groups and lawyers]
magically emerges’.46 UUP leader David Trimble queried the motives
of human-rights groups, claiming that they had only emerged to
oppose ‘supergrass’ evidence47 when such evidence was used against re-
publican organisations, and so this led him to ‘wonder about their
motives’.48 After the ceasefire, UUP spokesperson on security Ken
Maginnis, MP, continued to assert that even some of those involved
in the law supported the gun and the bomb.49
The unionist suspicions of the motivations of human-rights groups
were accompanied by a rejection of the substantive criticisms made of
the RUC. There was cross-party unionist opposition to any discipli-
nary action over the ‘shoot-to-kill’ operations investigated by John
Stalker.50 Jim Wells argued that ‘you can never kill an IRA terrorist
and be in the wrong…let the police force…go out in the clear confi-
dence that they can eradicate these gunmen and not have to face the
courts’.51 With this level of support even for the controversial opera-
tional decisions of the RUC and British Army, there is no evidence of
any willingness on the part of unionist political elites to compromise
on the issue of policing. In their view, the duty to defend the state is
fundamental and prior to the right to protection from the state.
Not only was there was widespread unionist support for those
RUC tactics that were criticised by human-rights groups, but politi-
cians from the two main unionist parties also called, throughout the
conflict, for what might be termed ‘hard-line’ security policies. There
was near unanimous support, for example, for capital punishment
and the use of ambush tactics against the IRA. Robert Bradford said
‘when capital punishment is applied…at least one terrorist has been
deterred’.52 Bradford later suggested that the Cromwellian period was
one of the few ‘peaceful’ periods in Irish history.53 The DUP called the
shooting of two IRA members in Derry in 1984 ‘an early Christmas
present’54 and also called for capital punishment and the placing of
minefields along the Border.55 William Ross supported a ‘shoot-to-
kill’ strategy, saying: ‘who the devil ever shot to miss?...I regret that the
job is not done often enough’.56 There is very little recognition that
such security policies reinforce support for militant republicanism and
support for the IRA. When this issue was put to Ernest Baird in the
context of the gospel passages on peacemakers, he responded with a
full defence of aggressive security, saying, ‘if you also read the Old
Testament there are some terrible things that God told his people to
do, things even the SAS might not contemplate in South Armagh’.57
UUP security spokesperson Ken Maginnis, MP, was absolute in his
support for aggressive security strategies on the ground, and uncom-
promising in his defence of the security forces in the aftermath of
controversial shoot-to-kill operations. He referred to such operations
as a ‘success’58 and has supported in principle the idea of ambushing
armed IRA members rather than trying to arrest them.59
The political wisdom of such security force activity is one of the
few issues on which there is a minority view openly expressed by any
significant section of unionist politicians. Independent MP Robert
McCartney, though later an opponent of the peace process, questioned
the tactical wisdom of aggressive and illegal security-force actions.
While supporting strict security policies he argued that an overly aggres-
sive military strategy which did not distinguish between IRA activists
and ‘ordinary’ nationalists would only increase support for the IRA.60
The Alliance Party also argued that no military solution could be found
in Northern Ireland unless there was political agreement first, in order,
in that party’s view, to isolate the IRA from the community that sup-
ported it,61 and Alliance was often critical of calls for hard-line security
policies.62 However, when the British Army shot eight IRA members
and a passing civilian in an ambush in Loughgall, even Alliance was
unambivalent in its support for the security forces, with party leader
John Cushnahan calling it a ‘successful security operation’.63
The extent of unionist rejections of human-rights-based critiques
of the RUC meant that human-rights discourse did not provide a
‘neutral’ or non-political language for discussing police reform.
Human-rights critiques were seen purely as instrumental attacks on
the police by the two main unionist parties, and debates on these
issues were always based on the core political divisions in Northern
Ireland.
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Rejection of the unrepresentative argument
As can be seen from the above discussion, there was no recognition
that nationalists were alienated from the RUC due to its ethos or
actions. Low levels of Catholic recruitment were explained, by union-
ists, as being due to IRA intimidation64 or due to the subversive nature
of the nationalist community.65 These two explanations are at least
potentially contradictory, and unionists were often not clear as to
which was the dominant explanation.
Occasionally unionist politicians argued that there was a ‘silent’
pro-British, Catholic minority and that the lack of Catholics in the
police could mainly be explained by IRA intimidation. UUP leader
James Molyneaux spoke in the 1970s and 1980s of the ‘many’
Roman Catholics who are not nationalists yet who support the RUC
and/or reject the IRA.66 His successor as UUP leader, David Trimble,
argued in 1996 that 25 to 40% of Roman Catholics wanted to
remain part of the United Kingdom.67 This line of argument was re-
inforced by the use of survey data from the police authority or other
sources, which appeared to show that a significant proportion of
Roman Catholics were satisfied with the RUC. However, such
surveys need to be read cautiously. The late John Whyte repeatedly
warned researchers in Northern Ireland (or those of any zone of con-
flict) of the dangers of using survey data, as he argued respondents
tend to give a more moderate or pro-officialdom answer rather than
offering their real views.68 Graham Ellison highlights the fact that
one of the most quoted surveys (the 1992 NI Social Attitudes Survey)
records Sinn Féin support at 2.8%, at a time when the party’s elec-
toral support was between 16% and 17%.69 It is difficult to assess
whether researchers conducting the 1992 Social Attitudes Survey did
not operate in the communities where Sinn Féin was strong, or if, in
general,people surveyed about their views during times of conflict
are more reluctant to express strong opinions. With such under-rep-
resentation of the Sinn Féin support base it is difficult to give such
surveys any credence. For this reason alone, the decision of the polic-
ing commission to hold so many public meeting across Northern
Ireland, where members could directly hear the perspectives of large
numbers of the public, was a wise one.70
The occasional public statement from unionist politicians over the
years, claiming that there existed a silent ‘loyal’ Catholic grouping, is
overwhelmed by the much larger number of unionist statements that
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are clear-cut in extending the definition of subversive to the entire na-
tionalist community (or even to the Catholic community). In 1985
Ken Maginnis said: 
you believe in…[Roman Catholics’] decency, you want
to get on well with them. But they come from the same
community the IRA comes from, and from which it re-
cruits. Therefore it is dangerous to get too close to
them.71
The following year he focused on the relatively high rates of vote
transfers, under the PRSTV system,72 between the SDLP and Sinn
Féin, to argue that 85 per cent of nationalists were lending support to
the IRA campaign.73 In the House of Commons in 1991, David
Trimble quoted as a form of precedent the practice of treating all
‘enemy aliens’ as suspects during wartime.74 The possibility that some
‘aliens’ might actually sympathise with their host country was out-
weighed by the strategic and security imperative, and so all ‘enemy
aliens’ were to be treated as suspect. The implication was that all na-
tionalists were ‘enemy aliens’ and similarly were to be seen as a threat.
Ian Paisley, speaking just prior to the ceasefires in 1994, said he could
not ‘trust the future of Ulster to any Roman Catholic and I say that
unashamedly’.75
This depiction of the entire nationalist community in Northern
Ireland as being subversive would suggest that nationalist views were
a more important explanation than IRA intimidation for the low
numbers of nationalists in the RUC. This perspective also strength-
ened unionist resistance to any suggestion that police reform was
essential to meet nationalist concerns, as, to use a phrase from the
UUP’s William Ross, a lack of nationalist support for the RUC was
not in itself an argument for reform of the police, as it would be ‘un-
reasonable’ to expect the RUC to get the support of ‘law-breakers’.76
Despite these attacks on the nationalist community for refusing
to support the RUC, individual Catholics who broke with their
community and joined the RUC, or became members of the Police
Authority, were frequently treated with suspicion. While unionists
attacked the SDLP for not allowing its members take seats on the
Police Authority, John McCrea of the Orange Order attacked pro-
posals to have individual nationalists appointed, saying they would
be a security risk.77 Following controversy over the rerouting of
Orange Order parades attempting to march through nationalist
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areas of Cookstown in 1985, Alan Kane (DUP) attacked one of the
most senior Catholic RUC officers, Chief Supt. Leo Dolan, saying
that Dolan, as ‘a Roman Catholic, a former neighbour of Owen
Carron’s family…is no friend of the Protestant people’.78 Willie
McCrea said Dolan was 
an ardent Roman Catholic who has shown his hatred of
Protestant parades in the past. His removal should be
forthcoming in order to ensure proper relations exist
between the RUC and the people of Cookstown.79
Following a similar incident associated with a parade in Portadown
in August 1995, the Portadown branch of the UUP issued a formal
statement attacking another senior Catholic officer, Bill McCreesh.80
In 1996 Peter Robinson called on Chief Constable Hugh Annesley to
weed out ‘Catholic moles’ in the RUC who Robinson accused of
making ‘nationalist’ comments to the media following newspaper cov-
erage of sectarian harassment within the RUC.81 This type of attack
on individual Catholic officers again points to a strong tendency in
unionism to treat the entire Catholic community as politically suspect
and incapable of being trusted police officers. It reinforces the sense
that the role of the police is to uphold a unionist vision of the consti-
tutional order and not simply to uphold the law.
‘Ulsterisation’ of security
The majority of unionist politicians argued throughout the conflict
that control of security should be returned to a unionist-controlled
parliament,82 and in the absence of such local authority saw the effec-
tive primacy of locally recruited security forces commanded by local
officers as a good second best. UUP leader David Trimble, for
example, said 
the IRA will only be defeated when they see that their
ultimate goal is unattainable. That day will only come
when the IRA see the control of security in the hands of
Ulstermen, because the Provos know Ulstermen cannot
afford to run away from the situation.83
This type of ‘asymmetric’ conflict, where one side sees it as an ‘all-
or-nothing’ conflict while the other side may have options, has
international parallels.84 The US could pull out of Vietnam with very
little threat to its domestic position. The South Vietnamese govern-
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ment had no such luxury. If it lost, its position was terminal. Unionists
consciously analysed their position within an asymmetric model. For
example, the Orange Order, comparing Northern Ireland to Israel
said, ‘Having been betrayed before they [the Ulster people] are very
alert now, for as Louis Gardner wrote, “Ulster, like Israel, can only
lose once”’.85 In a very similar vein Clifford Smyth quotes Admiral
Hugo Hendrik Bierman of the then South African Navy: ‘in the
nature of this protracted war our enemies have the opportunity to
attack time and again and to lose, whereas we shall have but one op-
portunity to lose’.86
Raymond Ferguson (UUP) argued that ordinary unionists would
not feel secure until control of security was returned to Ulster hands.87
In the late 1970s and early 1980s his colleague, Robert Bradford, em-
phasised the hegemonic importance of the ‘Ulsterisation’ of security: 
with one stroke the House [of Commons] could remove
the objective [of Irish unity] from the IRA—or at least
its hopes of attaining the objective. The House could
return to the people of Northern Ireland a devolved 
government,88
and again ‘the will to win will emerge only when Ulster politicians
have the right and the possibility of taking security decisions in their
own parliament’.89 Ian Paisley said in 1982 that ‘only those who are
fighting for their homes can really fight for their country’.90 Two years
later he returned to this theme, arguing that 
we did beat terrorism for almost 50 years…because we
had a government that was determined to beat terrorism
and because the people fighting terrorism had a stake in
this land. When you are fighting for your home, when
you are fighting for your heritage and when you are fight-
ing for your family, by the grace of God you will fight.91
During the conflict there was no likelihood of control over secu-
rity being devolved from London to unionist hands. The debate on
‘Ulsterisation’ of control did allow unionists to blame the British gov-
ernment for the failure to defeat the IRA and to argue that a
unionist-controlled police force could succeed. The support for de-
volution of control of policing also reflected a strong and deep-rooted
support within Unionism for devolved government and local control
of security. Later in the peace process this tension between mutually
incompatible choices—seeking to exclude nationalists while also
wresting control back from London to Northern Ireland—was finally
resolved in favour of devolution, but at the cost of sharing power
with nationalists and in the context of fundamentally reconstituted
political institutions. More generally, the above discussion of unionist
views during the conflict is repeated not to draw up old disputes or
to demonise those involved, but rather to highlight the very signifi-
cant shift in positions that was required to reach the agreement on
the trans formation of policing.
THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF POLICING
The nationalist community saw police reform as one of the most im-
portant issues in the peace process. It did not believe any peace deal
could be enduring if it did not deal with policing, because nationalists
believed that policing was at the heart of the conflict.92 The highly
politicised nature of policing, the legacy of human-rights concerns in
Northern Ireland and the highly unrepre sentative make-up of the RUC
ensured that no nationalist party could endorse the police and retain po-
litical support. It was also impossible for the RUC to provide policing
in nationalist areas without community support. The centrality of polic-
ing to the wider peace process was reflected in public debates that began
in the immediate aftermath of the ceasefires. The importance of this
issue was also clear (as can be seen in the chapters by Policing
Commission members in this volume) in the public meetings held by
the Commission and in those published submissions made by a wide
range of nationalist organisations.93 The two nationalist political parties
highlighted the issue of policing in regular statements. The SDLP made
it very clear that it would not endorse a tokenistic reform programme.
A survey of party members indicated that over 94 per cent of them
sought ‘radical reform’ of the RUC after the ceasefires.94 Sinn Féin ran
a high-profile, public campaign under the slogan ‘Disband the RUC’,
and its members supported this approach.95
Initially, mainstream Unionism’s position on policing led it to
dismiss any requirement to even consider RUC reform as part of the
process of a political settlement for Northern Ireland. In 1991 Paisley
listed as one of the key ‘unacceptable’ elements of the earlier Brooke
talks-process the idea that the RUC was part of the problem.96 After
the IRA ceasefire, unionists were very vocal in rejecting any public
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debate on the reform of the RUC.97 Even symbolic changes in the
name and uniform were rejected by all unionist parties other than
Alliance.98 The UUP, DUP and UKUP all opposed even the minor
administrative changes contained in the 1997 Police Bill.99 Ken
Maginnis went so far as to say that the very limited legislation ‘smacks
of thinking and planning that falls not short of treachery’.100
Rejecting any changes in the symbols used by the RUC, Unionist
MP Robert McCartney argued 
that if a person lives in a part of the United Kingdom
where his or her place within it is absolutely certain, such
as Cornwall or Devon, symbols are not, perhaps, so im-
portant, but if a person lives in a part of the United
Kingdom that is constantly under threat, along with
one’s identity, symbols take on a significance that they
would not otherwise bear.101
UUP security spokesperson Ken Maginnis, in the same debate, said:
the RUC is criticised because it holds on to its traditional
symbols: the badge, the royal prefix, the allegiance to the
Crown, the flying of the Union flag on pre-ordained days
on public buildings such as police stations, but all of
these are what makes the RUC a British police service,
not the French gendarmerie, the German polizie or the
Spanish civil guard. It is what gives a disciplined force its
esprit de corps, its sense of identity and comradeship
which has enabled it to endure and survive…I do not
believe that the official trappings of the RUC give offence
to anyone other than those who seek to be offended.
Their campaign is not to create a neutral working envi-
ronment but a neutered RUC, bereft of identity and
effectiveness from a lack of self-confidence.102
There was no recognition, at this stage, that nationalists could not
accept this esprit de corps, which was defined in exclusively unionist
terms; indeed, by defining the nationalist community as the ‘other’
against which the corps was pitted, its very essence was the exclusion
of Irish nationalism. 
Likewise, changes in the oath of allegiance (to the British
monarch) were rejected as symbolising a shift away from absolute
support for the constitutional status-quo. Maginnis again said,
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we are told that because it is an oath to the Queen it is un-
acceptable to some members of one tradition in Northern
Ireland. I think we all recognise that the oath to the
Queen shows loyalty to the state; the constitution.103
In a similar vein, Peter Weir said that the British government was
‘only concerned…with increasing the nationalist community’s confi-
dence in the police service, and that is a recipe for disaster’.104 Hugh
Smyth argued that politically motivated RUC reform would ‘wreck
the confidence of the unionist community’.105 Ian Paisley said the
police force should not be reformed, as ‘the RUC has stood between
us and those who would destroy us’.106 Even the Alliance Party sup-
ported only very limited calls for reform, with a policy statement in
1995 rejecting the idea of major structural changes in the RUC and
focusing instead on changes at the governmental level and in dealing
with individual complaints.107 The Alliance Party Election Manifesto
in 1997108 talks of RUC reform in very minimalist language, with no
discussion on the overall ethos and ideology of the Northern Ireland
police, and likewise Alliance’s submission to the Patten Commission
made no serious criticism of the RUC and restricted its suggestions to
symbolic changes in name and uniform.109
Given the strength of these opposing perspectives, it was not sur-
prising that all parties agreed, during the negotiations leading up to
the 1998 Agreement, that a solution to policing could not be negoti-
ated at that time and that an independent commission should be
established to make recommendations on policing, which would be
‘broadly representative’ and have ‘expert and international represen-
tation’.110 As part of a trade-off to get the British government to accept
such an independent commission, a related ‘review’ of the criminal
justice system was to be carried out by a mechanism set up by the
British government itself—though with an ‘independent element’.
This requirement was added at nationalist insistence and later on had
a significant impact in producing a much more far-reaching review
than had been anticipated by many observers.
There was no agreement during the 1998 talks on the specifics of
policing policy, but the terms of reference for an independent com-
mission to be established were set out in the Good Friday Agreement,
which stated:
Its proposals on policing should be designed to ensure
that policing arrangements, including composition, 
187
The politics of the transformation of policing
recruitment, training, culture, ethos and symbols, are
such that in a new approach Northern Ireland has a
police service that can enjoy widespread support from,
and is seen as an integral part of, the community as a
whole.111
The SDLP, Sinn Féin and the Irish government had put consid-
erable resources into achieving the strongest possible terms of
reference for a commission on policing. Surprisingly, the UUP ne-
gotiators did not seem as focused on this issue. Nationalist
negotiators were prepared for a last minute backlash from the UUP
to reverse the text of the terms of reference for a policing commis-
sion, but it did not materialise. The UUP was hugely focused on
limiting the North–South institutional linkages. Its negotiators were
very influenced by an analysis of the collapse of the 1974 power-
sharing institutions, which (over) emphasised the importance of the
all-island Council of Ireland in explaining unionist opposition to
that agreement. On policing, the UUP seemed to assume that a
British-government-appointed commission would largely favour the
status quo. The terms of reference were, however, fundamental to
the direction given to the Independent Commission on Policing for
Northern Ireland as finally established. Indeed Sinn Féin, despite a
cautious response to the later Report, did not press for any last
minute strengthening of the terms of reference in the final days of
negotiations.
The other difficulty for unionists was that RUC reform was an
area that could have been imposed by the British government
without their consent. Trimble acknowledged this in the aftermath of
the Agreement, saying ‘even had agreement not been reached in the
Talks a much more draconian series of reforms were planned for the
RUC’.112 However, if unionist leaders realised that change was in-
evitable, they made few serious attempts to deal with the political
problems that change would cause. The Sinn Féin leadership devoted
a lot of time and energy to regular meetings with its membership and
wider support base, to prepare them first of all for a ceasefire an-
nouncement and then for the various concessions made in talks. Yet
there was no similar process of engagement by the UUP leadership
with its own supporters to convince them of the need for compro-
mise, in advance of either the Good Friday Agreement itself, or the
publication of the Commission’s Report.113
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RESPONSES TO THE COMMISSION’S REPORT 
AND THE LEGISLATION
In the immediate aftermath of the publication of the Patten Report,
public debate was dominated by unionist rejection of its proposals.
The DUP was, at that point, still in opposition to the 1998
Agreement and predictably opposed the Report, but UUP leader and
First Minister David Trimble also attacked it in very trenchant terms,
calling it the ‘most shoddy piece of work I have seen in my entire life’
and referring to the name change for the RUC as a ‘gratuitous insult’.
Trimble said his party would study the report carefully before making
any judgement, but then said that the only fundamental change
needed to the RUC was the recruitment of many more Catholic of-
ficers, while the only thing necessary to achieve that was ‘to put an end
to the intimidation and social exclusion of Catholics who join the
police force’. He also expressed opposition to the proposed integration
of the controversial RUC Special Branch into the mainstream of the
new police service. Referring to this as the ‘emasculation of Special
Branch’, he said it was ‘above everything else, what the republican
movement wants’.114
Nationalist parties, possibly because of the hostile unionist reac-
tion, were very subdued in their responses to the Report. Nonetheless,
both nationalist parties were relatively positive in their initial state-
ments. While this might have been expected from the SDLP, Sinn
Féin’s Martin McGuinness also hinted that a positive response could
come in time. Responding to media queries as to whether the Report
met their ‘definition’ of disbanding the RUC, he said: ‘If we create a
new policing service, we will have effectively disbanded the RUC’.115
As for the SDLP, Seamus Mallon said the party wanted an immediate
ban on plastic bullets and a much shorter time-scale for the achieve-
ment of religious balance in the force, but he also said that the Report, 
taken in totality and implemented faithfully and speed-
ily, contains the basis for the objectives of the Good
Friday Agreement to be attained in terms of achieving a
police service which can attract and sustain the whole
community’s support.116
Ulster Unionist Party opposition to the Report over the following
months focused on a number of key themes. The most high-profile of
these were opposition to the name change and to the dropping of the
‘Royal’ prefix; however, the UUP also opposed the proposals on 50:50
recruitment of Catholics and others, on neutral symbols and flags, on
control of the Special Branch, on the International Oversight
Commissioner and Sinn Féin members sitting on police boards.117
Other unionist parties, organisations and high-profile individuals also
joined in the debate in opposition to the Report, including the Orange
Order and former RUC chief constable Jack Hermon.118 The Police
Authority, abandoning political neutrality, also publicly and strongly
attacked the proposals for 50:50 recruitment and the name change.119
In the wake of these responses, the British government announced
a three month period of debate on the Report, to finish on 30
November 1999. By the end of that period the SDLP had endorsed
the Report, calling for the full implementation of its 175
Recommendations. That party did, however, repeat its disappoint-
ment that plastic bullets were not to be banned and said the 10-year
deadline to reach a target of 30 percent Catholics in the new police
service was ‘hardly a radical target’.120 Sinn Féin, while continuing to
send positive signals, did not endorse the Report. In an initial response,
party leader Gerry Adams said that he ‘might…encourage young re-
publicans to join the proposed force’, saying ‘if we do come to a
conclusion that the Patten Report does contain the ingredients of a
new policing service and that the RUC will have gone, of course Sinn
Féin will come out in a very positive way’. He said it was 
not merely a question of whether Catholics should join
a new policing service…It is a question of whether re-
publicans and nationalists, and particularly working class
republicans and nationalists, would join such a policing
service and have peer approval for doing so. Ultimately,
this will be the acid test by which the Patten Commission
and its Recommendations will be judged.121
Later, in a formal response, the party said that it could not ‘at
present’ urge nationalists and republicans to join a police service on
the basis of the Patten Report.
Sinn Féin is not convinced at present that the Patten
Report goes far enough, and we are therefore unable at
present to take up the call to encourage people from na-
tionalist and republican communities to join any
emerging police service…We recognise there are many
good things in the Report.122
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On the specifics of the Report Sinn Féin welcomed the proposals
for accountability but said that they could have gone further. It also
welcomed the proposed closure of interrogation centres, but said that
the Report’s target of achieving 30 per cent Catholic members in ten
years was inadequate, and that the Report should have proposed an
end to emergency laws and the use of plastic bullets. In a further pos-
itive signal, however, a motion by one cumann (local branch) at the
party’s Ard Fheis (annual conference) which would have tied the party
to seeking to exclude every RUC officer from membership of the
PSNI was rejected by the party delegates.123
The main point emphasised by Sinn Féin in this period was that
it needed to know what the British government would do, and there-
fore it would reserve final judgement on whether it would urge
people to join any new police service until it saw the appropriate leg-
islation on implementing the Report’s recommendations. This point
was the key issue of contention with the SDLP, whom Sinn Féin
accused of acting prematurely.124 Sinn Féin did not trust the British
government to implement the Report and so it was wary that endors-
ing it might turn it into a nationalist ‘wish list’, rather than an
Independent Commission Report, which did not, by any measure,
represent all of Sinn Féin’s positions. In fact, when the new Police
Bill was published by in May 2000, the British government had
abandoned key recommendations in the Commission’s Report and
did indeed seek to present the legislation as a ‘compromise’ between
a nationalist-supported Commission report and unionist opposition
to change.
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT’S LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
The British government’s implementing legislation (the Police Bill) and
a parallel ‘implementation plan’, purporting to show how it would im-
plement the Commission’s Report,125 was roundly criticised not only by
the two nationalist parties in Northern Ireland but by most significant
human-rights groups, nationalist commentators and civil society organ-
isations.126 The Irish government too signalled its displeasure that so
many of the Commission’s 175 recommendations had been rejected by
the British government.127 John Hume called the Police Bill ‘defective’,128
while Gerry Adams stated 
there is no way at this time that I, or Sinn Féin, could
recommend to nationalists or republicans that they
should consider joining or supporting a police force as
described in that legislation.129
The Deputy First Minister and SDLP MP Seamus Mallon, reacted
to British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Peter Mandelson’s
depictions of his legislation as a compromise between nationalist
support for the Patten Report and unionist opposition, saying that
‘Patten is itself a compromise. It is policing not in the image of union-
ism or nationalism’.130 Both the SDLP and Sinn Féin issued lengthy
critiques of the Bill.131 Nationalist critiques focused on the insertion of
the phrase ‘incorporating the RUC’ in the formal title of the new
PSNI; the potential continuation of the practice of flying the Union
Jack on police stations; the weakening of oversight, human rights and
accountability mechanisms; the potential weakening of the commit-
ment to 50:50 recruitment; provisions allowing the British government
or chief constable to veto investigations into allegations of police mal-
practice; and the limitation of a new oath of office to new recruits only
(rather than having it apply to all existing officers as recommended by
the Commission). Statements reflected all of the traditional nationalist
critiques of the RUC—the counter-insurgency priority, human-rights
issues and community representation and ethos issues.
The unionist public response was relatively muted; while still op-
posing much of the Bill, unionists clearly preferred it to the
Commission’s Report. They focused on the symbols of the service—
the RUC title, the retention of British symbols in the police insignia,
the flying of the Union Jack and displays of portraits of the British
monarch in police stations.132 The May 2000 Police Bill was seen as
a victory for unionist lobbying in regard to these issues. The Police Bill
also included a significant weakening of the oversight, human rights
and accountability proposals made in the Commission’s Report. While
Ulster Unionists did not oppose the British government’s overturning
of the Commission’s recommendations in these areas, there is little
evidence of a vigorous unionist campaign—the motivation for reject-
ing the Commission’s recommendations on oversight and human
rights seemed to come from the British government itself and the
police and security agencies. While the outgoing police authority had
criticised the Commission’s Report—in particular on the core unionist
issues of name, symbols and ex-IRA prisoners being on police
boards—during this phase of the debate members of the authority
criticised the British government for weakening the powers of the pro-
posed new policing board.133
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Following an extensive campaign of pressure from the nationalist
parties, some British Labour backbenchers, senior US politicians and
human-rights groups,134 and a series of inter-party talks in Weston Park
in England in 2001, the British government introduced a number of
significant amendments to its own proposed legislation, in order to
bring it closer to the recom mendations of the Commission’s Report. It
also promised a revised implementation plan,135 which would further
deal with some of the remaining Commission recommendations.
Finally, the British government promised to have an international judge
examine possible RUC involvement in the murder of Pat Finucane and
to hold a public inquiry on the murder if that judge recommended it.136
This was sufficient for the Irish government and the SDLP to
support the new arrangements, and in August 2001 the SDLP agreed
to join the new policing board.137 The SDLP claimed it had secured
sufficient amendments from the British government to allow its
members to do so. Seamus Mallon, referring to the previous British
Secretary of State, Peter Mandelson, said the legislation had been ‘de-
Mandelised’. He highlighted in particular: the strengthening of the
powers of inquiry of the Policing Board—now gaining powers for-
merly resting with the Chief Constable and the Secretary of State;
new powers for the Police Ombudsman to access documents and in-
vestigate police policies and practices; commitment to the secondment
of Gardaí (members of the Irish police service, An Garda Síochána) to
the new police service; strengthened commitment to human rights;
greater focus on community policing and the phasing out of the full-
time RUC reserve.138
Sinn Féin refused to join the Policing Board or support the PSNI
at this time, arguing that the proposed legislation and the British gov-
ernment’s ‘implementation plan’ for police reform were still far weaker
than the Commission’s recommendations. Although Sinn Féin had
not given unqualified support to the Commission’s Report when pub-
lished, from this time Sinn Féin explicitly used the Commission’s
Report as a benchmark against which to measure the transformation
of policing.139 Another very positive development for Sinn Féin was
the quality and detail of the reports of the first Oversight
Commissioner, Tom Constantine. His very detailed performance in-
dicators, judging action on policing as compared to the Commission’s
recommendations, ensured that the British government did not have
a monopoly of authoritative information.140 The role of the Oversight
Commission was, in hindsight, one of the most significant and inno-
vative of the Commission’s recommendations and greatly assisted in
both clarifying Sinn Féin’s remaining concerns and as an independent
mechanism to judge progress on those concerns. Sinn Féin, from this
point, focused on the remaining gaps between the Commission’s rec-
ommendations and British government decisions—especially on
accountability, human rights and oversight; on retention of some key
powers in London; on control of the Special Branch and covert polic-
ing operations; on the need to avoid officers being deployed long-term
into Special Branch, as had occurred in the RUC; and on the lack of
certainty about the RUC name and badge. These Sinn Féin critiques,
though fewer in number than their formal responses to the May leg-
islation, continue to raise issues in each of the three areas that have
dominated nationalist responses to policing in Northern Ireland: a
concern that counter-insurgency policing dominates the entire polic-
ing system; a demand for stronger oversight on human-rights issues;
and an insistence on politically impartial policing, free from symbolic
attachment to the British state.141
Unionist parties, notwithstanding their opposition to elements of
the reform agenda, also agreed to join the Policing Board. Both the
DUP and UUP highlighted two continuing priorities in announcing
their decision to join the Board. The first was to ensure that the police
service’s symbols would ‘recognise Northern Ireland’s constitutional
position in the UK’, indicating how important the police were to
unionist definitions of the nature of the state. The second priority was
the unionists’ ongoing campaign to minimise the reduction in the size
of the force and in particular the full-time RUC reserve.142
The Police Board unanimously agreed on a new PSNI symbol in
December 2001.143 While not strictly following the Com mission’s rec-
ommendation of having a badge that was ‘entirely free from any
association with either the British or Irish states’, the new badge was
widely judged to be acceptable. The badge’s largest element is the
‘cross of St Patrick’, acceptable to both nationalists and unionists. It
also incorporates the crown—as a symbol of Britishness—and the
Irish symbols of the harp and shamrock, neither standing in a hierar-
chical relationship to the other, along with traditional symbols of
justice—the laurel leaf, torch and scales of justice.
This achievement was swamped, however, by the wider crisis in
the peace process that led to the suspension of the power-sharing ex-
ecutive and Assembly in October 2002, as the UUP refused to
continue sharing power with Sinn Féin without the handover or de-
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struction of IRA weapons. New elections in November 2003 saw the
DUP emerge as the largest unionist party and Sinn Féin as the largest
nationalist party—entitling the leaders of these parties to hold the
offices of First Minister and Deputy First Minister, respectively.144
No agreement on power-sharing was possible and the Assembly was
immediately suspended. The key issues in dispute were unionists’
refusal to share power with Sinn Féin without the IRA destroying its
weapons, and the IRA refusal to do so while the peace process was
stalled and while the newly agreed institutions of government within
Northern Ireland and between North and South were not opera-
tional. Nationalists also demanded ‘demilitarisation’ by the British
Army145 and further moves on policing.
The IRA agreed to put its weapons ‘beyond use’ in a process over-
seen and observed by an International Commission on
Decom missioning, led by Canadian General John de Chastelain, and
completed in September 2005.146 This was the key defining moment
for Sinn Féin. The destruction of IRA weapons was a major political
decision. The initial IRA ceasefire could be interpreted (or sold) as an
experiment. An IRA campaign could have been restarted, and indeed
was resumed (at a low level) between February 1996 and July 1997.
However, symbolically, the destruction of weapons was a clear signal
that the IRA was not intending to restart its campaign and that Sinn
Féin would pursue republican goals by exclusively peaceful means.
The next logical step was support for policing. However, no wider
agreement on power-sharing with unionists or Sinn Féin support for
the police was reached at this time.
Agreement seemed to have finally been reached in talks in St
Andrews in Scotland in October 2006.147 The St Andrews Agreement
was officially between the Irish and British governments, but they ex-
pected (on the basis of the talks) that it would be endorsed by the
parties in Northern Ireland after consultation with their membership.
St Andrews provided for a deal whereby the suspended Northern
Ireland Executive and Assembly would be re-constituted, with new
provisions and commitments made by the parties to avoid the insti-
tutions collapsing again when the members were in dispute. New
elections would be held as a means of gaining community endorse-
ment of the power-sharing deal. New legislation on policing, human
rights and the Irish language was promised—that on policing would
be passed by the end of 2006; and the British government guaranteed
that there would be no ‘executive role’ for the British secret service
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(MI5) in Northern Ireland—even on ‘national security’ issues—when
control of policing was devolved to Northern Ireland. Sinn Féin was
expected to endorse the police service, and while there was no firm
date to devolve control of policing from London to the Northern
Ireland Executive, the two governments stated that it was their 
view that implementation of the Agreement published
today should be sufficient to build the community con-
fidence necessary for the Assembly to request the
devolution of criminal justice and policing from the
British Government by May 2008.148
Sinn Féin held up to 60 meetings with the party support base right
across Ireland to gauge opinion on the question of supporting the
PSNI.149 A special party Ard Fheis (conference) was called with dele-
gates from every local branch of the party, and the leadership needed
to be certain that it would secure an overwhelming majority to avoid
the danger of a split in the party. Difficulties began to emerge,
however, when senior DUP MP (and later deputy leader) Nigel
Dodds said publicly that devolution of control over policing from
London (a key Sinn Féin demand) would not happen in a ‘political
lifetime’.150 Sinn Féin also raised concerns that the proposed new role
for MI5 in countering international terrorism would be extended to
include Northern Ireland and would lead to institutionalised links
with the new PSNI, creating, Sinn Féin feared, a new ‘force within a
force’—to use the phrase which had also been used to describe the
old RUC Special Branch by the Commission in its Report.151 British
Prime Minister Tony Blair personally responded on this issue in a
public statement, saying
No police officers will be seconded to or under the
control of the security service. The small number of
police officers who act in a liaison capacity with the se-
curity service will be PSNI headquarters staff acting in
that role for fixed time-limited periods to the extent that
the Chief Constable deems necessary for them to
perform their duties…Policing is the responsibility solely
of the PSNI. The security service will have no role whats
oever in civic policing.152
This statement was welcomed by Sinn Féin and seemed to resolve
tensions on the role of MI5.153
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The debate within Sinn Féin was intense and relatively public—
unusually so for a party whose internal discipline is legendary in Irish
politics. Over 1000 people attended a meeting, which the press were
permitted to observe, in Gerry Adams’s own constituency.154 Letters
for and against endorsing the PSNI were carried in the Sinn Féin news-
paper An Phoblacht.155 The newspaper also carried very prominent
messages of support for the leadership position from former African
National Congress chief negotiator Cyril Ramaphosa and the
Palestinian ambassador to Ireland, Hikmat Ajjuri. The Ard Fheis itself
was attended by 3,000 delegates, and the motion committing the party
to ‘fully’ support the PSNI and the criminal justice system, and to take
up places on the Policing Board and the local District Policing
Partnership Boards was carried, with an estimated 90 percent ‘yes’
vote.156 Gerry Adams, in proposing the motion, said party negotiators
were now satisfied with the legislation on oversight of policing and on
the model of a Justice Department to be established in the Northern
Ireland Assembly. The motion was linked to the re-establishment of
the power-sharing Executive in Northern Ireland and to the agreement
on devolution of policing and justice powers. Or, in the absence of such
agreement, to a new governance model for Northern Ireland based on
stronger British–Irish ‘partnership arrangements’. This was read by all
to mean a formalised model of co-operation between the governments
over the heads of the local parties.157
Despite linking the issue of policing to the restoration of power-
sharing, party leader Gerry Adams, following a meeting of the party’s
Ard Chomhairle (national executive) held immediately after the con-
ference, expressed Sinn Féin’s support for the PSNI and for
nationalists who wished to join it.158 Sinn Féin now believed that there
was sufficient progress for the party to offer support for the police
service and to join the Policing Board. The three key criticisms of the
RUC set out at the beginning of this chapter—its prioritisation of
counter-insurgency, its human rights record and its unionist ethos
and make-up—were no longer significant issues of concern for Sinn
Féin. There were some continuing concerns on the role of MI5, on the
future of the Special Branch and on the need for investigations into
historical abuses by the RUC. However, the party believed all of these
issues could be resolved through new accountability structures.
Following the Sinn Féin decision, elections to the Northern
Ireland Assembly (the next step in the agreed process) were called for
March 2007. Unionists were relatively subdued in their responses to
the Sinn Féin change of policy, adopting a ‘wait and see’ attitude.
The March 2007 elections saw further significant gains for both Sinn
Féin and the DUP, meaning, under the power-sharing rules, that they
would take the positions of First Minister and Deputy First Minister
from a position of strength. Dissident republican candidates, stand-
ing on a platform of opposition to Sinn Féin’s decision on policing,
received only tiny levels of support.159 The DUP agreed to form a
power-sharing executive, with its party leader Ian Paisley as First
Minister and Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness as Deputy First
Minister, and the Assembly was restored in May 2007.160 Sinn Féin
then joined the Policing Board, and even the nomination by the
party of a former high-profile IRA prisoner (Martina Anderson) as
one of its three nominees did not generate any significant unionist
comment, with the DUP’s Gregory Campbell, saying ‘we have to
move on’.161 However, senior DUP figures did continually cast doubt
over whether they would support the May 2008 deadline for devo-
lution of policing and justice powers from London, as had been set
out in the St Andrews Agreement. They insisted they would not do
so until the unionist community had ‘confidence’ in Sinn Féin having
influence over such a ministry.162 The progress made in transforming
nationalists’ relations with the police was highlighted when PSNI
chief constable Hugh Orde attended a meeting in July 2007 at the in-
vitation of Gerry Adams to discuss anti-social crime in the Sinn Féin
heartland of West Belfast—the first ever such meeting to be attended
by a Chief Constable.163
However, as the deadline for agreement on the devolution of
control of policing approached, unionist parties raised new objections:
calling for the IRA leadership structures to be publicly disbanded,164
demanding a veto over the ministerial nominee (to ensure it would
not be a Sinn Féin minister),165 seeking further financial guarantees on
public funding for policing from the British government166 and linking
the issue to the ongoing disputes over parades by the Orange Order
through nationalist areas.167 Despite some significant pressure from the
two governments, unionists continued to refuse to agree to the devo-
lution of control of policing. The DUP’s public position was that
greater unionist ‘confidence’ was required. In reality, the party seemed
uncertain how such a decision would be received by its supporters.
As Sinn Féin had linked its earlier decision to support the PSNI
to the devolution of control, this was a key issue for them. By mid-
June 2008 the party was refusing to allow meetings of the Northern
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Ireland Assembly to take place (it had the power to do this as the
office of ‘Deputy’ First Minister is in de-facto terms that of Joint
First Minister, and both must agree to all decisions, including the
agenda for Executive meetings). Sinn Féin’s position was that the
failure to devolve policing was a test case of the DUP’s wider com-
mitment to power-sharing and the peace process. If this could not be
agreed, then perhaps the logic of the entire peace process was being
questioned and Sinn Féin needed to look for another political strat-
egy. In the short-term this was likely to involve walking out of the
Northern Ireland Executive, triggering fresh elections and the party
seeking a new mandate.
The decision was on a knife edge. The DUP clearly wanted to
maintain devolution but was uneasy with sharing power with former
enemies. The DUP leadership, with the party now headed by Peter
Robinson following Ian Paisley’s retirement at the end of May 2008,
were also uncertain as to whether they could bring their own support
base with them if they took a decision to devolve policing and thereby
link their political fortunes clearly to sharing power with Sinn Féin
and working the Belfast/Good Friday and St Andrews Agreements. 
In September 2008 a report by the Independent Monitoring
Commission168 confirmed that the IRA ‘Army Council’ was not func-
tional or operational and posed no threat to the peace process. After
a five-month stand-off during which no Executive meetings took
place, a breakthrough was achieved in November 2008 when the
DUP and Sinn Féin agreed on a 37-point road plan towards devolu-
tion of policing and justice. The two parties also agreed that neither
would seek to hold the Justice ministerial portfolio during its first
Assembly term. 
In March 2009, British Army soldiers Cengiz Azimkar and Mark
Quinsey and PSNI Constable Stephen Carroll were killed, in separate
attacks in Antrim and Craigavon. Responsibility for these attacks was
claimed by members of small ‘dissident’ splinter groups from the IRA
who opposed the peace process. The Good Friday Agreement institu-
tions survived this potential test of their durability, and a significant
display of political unity and determination to uphold the Nortehrn
Ireland Executive and Assembly resulted instead. Work proceeded on
the basis of the 37-point plan throughout the remainder of 2009, pri-
marily at Assembly Executive Review Committee (AERC) level within
the Assembly and also through the passage of necessary enabling leg-
islation at Westminster. In the latter half of the year, the Irish and
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British governments were involved in intensive efforts to assist and
encourage the Northern Ireland parties to complete the devolution
of policing and justice and to address other outstanding aspects of the
St Andrews Agreement that still required implementation. In October,
prospects for completion of the devolution project were further as-
sisted by provision of a supportive financial package by the British
government. 
Towards the end of January 2010, it became clear that the
Northern Ireland parties themselves were unable to agree on how to
move ahead. Earlier that month, a totally unrelated crisis within the
DUP and the forced resignation from the Assembly of the First
Minister’s wife (a prominent unionist politician in her own right)
brought matters to a head for the party leadership. Continuing stale-
mate at that stage could perhaps see Peter Robinson’s position as DUP
leader and First Minister weakened. If he wanted to take the party in
the direction of sharing power he had to make that decision quickly
or he might lose the initiative. The pressure to reach a final decision
seemed to create some flexibility and the opportunity for a new round
of intense negotiations. The Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister
met in London on 25 January and decided to travel directly to
Hillsborough where they convened all party talks.
Following ten days of intensive negotiations, the DUP and Sinn
Féin finalised a comprehensive agreement on 5 February 2010, which
set up a process aimed at devolving policing powers to Northern
Ireland by April 2010 and restoring the functioning of the Executive.
This was endorsed by the Northern Ireland Assembly on 9 March
2010 and political control over policing was devolved to Northern
Ireland on 12 April 2010, with Alliance party leader David Ford ap-
pointed as Justice Minister by cross-community vote. Even if there
are some further obstacles to a sustained agreement it is now clear that
the main unionist and nationalist parties are willing to share power
over policing—thus completing the last piece of the political/institu-
tional framework of the transformation of policing.
CONCLUSION
Unionists and nationalists have not resolved or reconciled their differ-
ent views on how policing was conducted during the conflict in
Northern Ireland, but they have negotiated a series of agreements that
puts in place an institutional framework that transcends their former
200
POL IC ING THE NARROW GROUND
deeply oppositional stances. Nationalist political discourse no longer
characterises policing in counter-insurgency terms, and there is even
support for the police in the face of the lingering threat of small and
marginal IRA splinter groups who oppose the peace process. There
are some continuing issues around human rights, in particular on the
use of plastic bullets and control of intelligence agencies, but there is
a degree of confidence that the new structures of accountability can
progress on those issues. Finally, there is support amongst nationalists
for recruitment to the PSNI and this, along with 50:50 recruitment,
has seen the service’s demography transformed. There is still some
debate on whether 50:50 recruitment should continue into the future,
until a higher target—perhaps of 40 per cent of members from a na-
tionalist background—is reached, and there is pressure to extend that
policy to civilian posts in policing, which remain very unrepresentative
of the nationalist community.169
Unionist political parties have been uncomfortable with some
aspects of the process of transformation, but they have also achieved
some of their key aims. The two major nationalist parties, representing
nearly 100 per cent of nationalist voters, now support the police and
police recruitment. Control of policing is now in local hands, even if
it must be shared with nationalists, and unionists have avoided the
symbolic difficulty of having a Sinn Féin Minister for Justice. They
remain uneasy with 50:50 recruitment, with the loss of British flags
and symbolism in police stations and with some of the retrospective
enquiries into allegations of human-rights abuses. Ultimately, union-
ists did not have the political power to veto those decisions, which
could have been introduced directly by the British government.
Where they did have a veto—on devolving power and sharing it with
nationalists—they have accepted this political reality as part of the
cost of getting and maintaining a local political authority and securing
nationalist support for the police. The unionist community in par-
ticular has been fragmented by these changes, and a significant
minority within that community continues to oppose the underlying
logic of the peace process, including the new policing arrangements.
This is demonstrated by the formation of a new political party—the
Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV)—from among former DUP rep-
resentatives.170 It represents a minority view within unionism, but
unlike IRA dissidents, has a significant level of public support and
will continue to pressurise unionists who participate in the power-
sharing institutions with Sinn Féin. In elections to the UK parliament
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in May 2010, however, the TUV got fewer votes than anticipated—
polling only 3.9% of the vote, compared to 25% for the DUP and
15% for the UUP-British Conservative alliance.
The politics of policing transformation in Northern Ireland, the
nature and timing of the Agreements that created the atmosphere for
such transformation, and the difficulty in reaching them, are clear evi-
dence that policing powers and structures are an integral part of the
constitutional framework of contested societies and not a lower-order
matter that can be more easily divided up as ‘spoils of peace’. Each step
in the process of change, from the 1998 Agreement, to the debate on
the International Commission’s Report, to the various inter-party talks
and agreements, linked discussion on policing to other issues in the
peace process, such as governmental power-sharing, North–South co-
operative institutions, demilitarisation by the British Army, arms
decommissioning by the IRA and other equality issues such as language
rights. Both nationalists and unionists strongly linked police reform to
the wider peace process, and progress on policing would have been 
impossible without agreement on an open-ended constitutional frame -
work that required neither political community to abandon their
longer-term political goals. Nationalists did not and would not have
abandoned their political campaign for a united Ireland in return for
policing reform. Unionists would not have accepted the transformation
of policing without a balanced constitutional and political agreement
and without the IRA ending its armed campaign.
Without a transformation of Northern Ireland itself there would
have been no transformation of policing. The transformation was ex-
plicitly linked to the consociational power-sharing model at the heart
of the new political structures in Northern Ireland, and the interlinked
institutions between the Northern Ireland Executive and the
Government of the Ireland. These institutions saw political power
shared between the political communities at executive level, and on
the policing board, and re-inforced the importance of equality—mea-
sured in particular, but not exclusively, as between the two national
communities. They also saw a constitutional and institutional reflec-
tion of Irish nationalists’ political identity and ambitions, while
guaranteeing unionists that a united Ireland would not be enforced
without majority support within Northern Ireland itself.
Policing transformation has its own particular agenda, as discussed
throughout this book—issues such as accountability structures,
human rights, training, management and police culture. These
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debates need to draw on international best practice and be adapted to
local conditions. The Northern Ireland case can add to the debate on
the nature of best practice in a number of these domains. However,
most crucially, as a case study the Northern Ireland experience demon-
strates that while you can have a ‘police force’ without consent or
agreement, you can only have ‘community policing’ and a ‘police
service’ in post-conflict societies if policing is embedded in a wider
political agreement that deals with the political and social roots of the
conflict, and if the structures, symbols and ethos of policing and the
composition of the police service all reflect the ethos and spirit of that
wider peace agreement.
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